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AIRLINE DEREGULATION TEN YEARS AFTER:




AMONG THE most important legacies of the Reagan
Administration's economic policy has been its
steadfast drive toward privatization and deregulation of
American industry. As part of the "New Federalism",
government-run or regulated industries, such as transpor-
tation, communications, securities, banking and energy,
have become prime examples of a vigorous and compre-
hensive governmental retreat.
The first industry to be subjected to this revolution was
the airline industry. The move toward deregulating the
airlines actually began in the 1970s. It was initially pro-
moted by President Gerald Ford, and then realized under
Jimmy Carter with the appointment of Cornell economist
Alfred E. Kahn as Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics
Board, and the promulgation of the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978. Still, most of the effects of this change have
been felt in the 1980s. In light of the Reagan Administra-
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tion's strong ideological stance in favor of sharply re-
duced federal involvement in economic affairs, including
not only pricing and entry deregulation, but antitrust ab-
dication as well, most observers probably associate airline
deregulation with the Reagan era. Moreover, with the de-
mise of the Civil Aeronautics Board on December 31,
1984, and the transfer of its remaining regulatory respon-
sibilities to the United States Department of Transporta-
tion (DOT), aviation policy has been moved from an
independent regulatory agency to an executive branch
agency.' Hence, it is now, and for the first time, all the
President's men who set regulatory policy for the airline
industry.
This Article examines the effects of airline deregulation
on the United States air passenger transportation system
over the past decade by focusing on three major areas that
have been significantly impacted: airline industry struc-
ture, air service, and air safety. Throughout this analysis,
the two themes of concentration in scale and greater in-
dustry volatility emerge as particularly important. Airline
deregulation has led to increased market shares by the
largest airlines, and to increased concentrations of traffic
at the largest hub airports. Further, deregulation has led
to greater instability in the airline industry structure, in air
service, and in air safety. All of these results have impor-
tant implications for future planning in United States air
transportation.
The discussion begins with a short synopsis of the his-
tory of regulation and deregulation in the United States
air passenger transportation system. Separate sections on
each of the three major topics then follow, with an overall
assessment of deregulatory impacts concluding the
Article.
II. HISTORY OF REGULATION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION
Economic regulation in air transportation was inaugu-
49 U.S.C. app. § 1551(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
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rated by Congress with its promulgation of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938.2 This Act created the Civil
Aeronautics Authority, reorganized as the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board (CAB) in 1940, and gave it jurisdiction to con-
trol route entry and exit of air carriers, regulate fares,
award subsidies, and control mergers and intercarrier
agreements. Regulation was deemed essential in order
to protect the infant industry from excessive levels of
competition which had emerged during the Great Depres-
sion. Indeed, the legislative history is replete with pejora-
tive adjectives, variously defining the competition of the
era as "destructive,' ''cutthroat," "extreme,' ".wasteful,"
"excessive," and "unrestrained," the cumulative effect of
which was having deleterious consequences for this indus-
try potentially so important to development of the domes-
tic and foreign commerce of the United States.
Regulation, it was believed, would provide the economic
stability essential to the sound growth and development
of air transportation, which in turn would serve as a cata-
lyst for national economic growth.4
During the ensuing decades, the air transportation in-
dustry steadily grew and matured while regulated by the
CAB and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 5
Skeptical economists, however, gradually began to ques-
tion the desirability of continued economic regulation as
- Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 977 [hereinafter The 1938 Act], repealed by Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended
at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
:, E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES 11 (1985)
[hereinafter BAILEY]; see P. DEMPSEY & W. THOMS, LAW & EcONOMIc REGULATION
IN TRANSPORTATION 26-29 (1986) (Congress perceived that if government regula-
tion produced order and stability in the infant airline industry, the industry could
attract the needed capital for expansion from reassured investors who, following
the Depression, might be reluctant to take risks absent this government
intervention).
I Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board-Opening l'ide the Flood-
gates of Entiy, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91, 95-108 (1979) (the article details the legislative
debate and discussion preceeding The 1938 Act).
The FAA was created by Congress in 1958 to specifically handle safety issues.
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 301, 72 Stat. 744 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1341 (1982)).
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the airline industry grew and developed.6 Further studies
on the performances of less regulated intrastate air carri-
ers in California and Texas prompted many observers to
conclude that economic regulation resulted in excessively
high fares, and a net economic loss to society at large.7
These and other studies contributed to a growing con-
sensus among economists that economic regulation in the
domestic airline industry was distorting the efficient per-
formance of the market-place by creating excessive ser-
vice and insufficient price competition, and was therefore
undesirable. This consensus, together with strong polit-
ical support from Senator Edward Kennedy, among
others, led to the passage of the Air Cargo Deregulation
Act of 1977 and the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) of
-; See R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS: AN INDUSTRY STUDY 411-
49 (1962) (Caves determined that economists would not reach the same results
and decisions as the CAB regarding the degree of necessary airline profit and the
management of routes); L. KEYES, FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY AND EXIT INTO AIR
TRANSPORTATION 307-46 (1951) (Keyes theorized that the CAB regulatory policy
of protecting the revenues of existing airlines impeded the best adjustment of
output distribution among airlines and products; she therefore recommended
abandonment of the protective aspects of regulation that conflicted with a rational
subsidy policy).
See G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER III, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR
TRANSPORT: THEORY AND POLICY 170-85 (1974) (Through two analyses of
trunkline cost data, the authors found no significant economies of scale operating
at the trunk carrier level that would prohibit deregulation from making the air fare
market more efficient); W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS
AND IMPERFECTIONS 226-44 (1970) (This study compares the performance of the
CAB regulated airlines with nonregulated intrastate California airlines and finds
that although CAB regulation resulted in higher service quality, it also restricted
entry into the industry, promoted mergers, allowed for price discrimination and
motivated airlines to operate inefficiently); Keeler, Airline Regulation and Market Per-
forniance, 3 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 399, 421-23 (1972) (This article explains a
1968 study finding that on regulated short routes fares were at least 20% higher
than on unregulated short routes, and that on longer routes, the regulated fare
could be 95% higher than the unregulated fare); Note, Is Regulation .Vecessarv: Cali-
fornia Air Transportation and National Regilato-
, 
Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416 (1965) (Af-
ter analyzing the contrasts between the performance of unregulated intrastate
California markets and similar regulated interstate markets, this article found:
"Government restriction of entry into the airline industry and regulation of fares
has fostered unnecessarily high fares, encouraged uneconomic practices, and lim-
ited the variety of services available to the public").
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1978,8 both signed into law by President Jimmy Carter.
Simply put, the ADA mandated that the CAB would no
longer have authority over route entry or exit, nor over
airline fares, after a transition period from 1978 to 1982,
with the CAB itself to be dissolved on December 31,
1984.9
Since 1980, the Reagan Administration's policy toward
the air transportation industry has been one of enthusias-
tic support for continued and expanded deregulation. In
addition to the airline industry, deregulatory movements
in the railroad, trucking, bus, telephone, and banking in-
dustries were all realized under the Reagan Administra-
tion. Table 1 contains a partial list of major steps taken in
the contemporary era toward comprehensive deregula-
tion of American industry.
III. AIRLINE INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
Prior to deregulation, four major classes of commercial
air carriers had emerged: trunk, local service, intrastate,
and commuter. Trunk airlines evolved from a group of
sixteen carriers which had been offering scheduled service
at the time of the 1938 Act, and were granted certificates
to continue service under the "grandfather" clause of the
Act. As a result of ensuing mergers, ten trunk airlines had
become the major domestic carriers by the time deregula-
Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended throughout scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
1- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551 (Supp. IV 1986). See generally S. MORRISON & C. WIN-
STON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION 4 (1986). The standard
a carrier had to meet to gain entry into a market was gradually lowered through-
out the transition period. Prior to 1978, a carrier had to show that entry was
required by public convenience and necessity. Between 1978 and 1981, a carrier
had to show that entry was consistent with public convenience and necessity. Since
1982, entry has been granted to all carriers that are fit, willing and able. Id.
The CAB granted airlines autonomy in setting fares on a gradual basis as well.
Although the airlines exercised considerable freedom in setting fares prior to
1978, for a period after deregulation, there were still some restrictions on in-
creases above pre-deregulation levels. After 1983, all fare regulation was elimi-
nated. Id.
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Table 1
Examples of Recent Deregulatory Initiatives by Congress, the
Judiciary, and Administrative Agencies
1968 - U.S. Supreme Court allows non-AT&T equipment
to be hooked up to Bell System
1969 - Federal courts allow MCI long distance access to
residential telephones
1970 - Interest rates on deposits of more than $100,000
deregulated
1972 - FCC adopts open skies satellite policy
1975 - SEC abolished fixed brokerage fees
ICC prohibits rate bureau protests for independent
rate filings
1976 - Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act
1977 - Air Cargo Deregulation Act
1978 - Airline Deregulation Act
Natural Gas Policy Act
OSHA revokes 928 rules
1979 - FCC deregulation of earth satellite stations
1980 - Motor Carrier Act
Staggers Rail Act
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act
International Air Transportation Competition Act
Household Goods Transportation Act
FCC deregulation of cable television
1981 - Executing Order decontrol of crude oil and refined
petroleum prices
FCC deregulation of non-entertainment
programming for radio
1982 - Bus Regulatory Reform Act
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institution Act
Modified Final Judgment in U.S. v. AT&T
1984 - The Shipping Act
Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act
Cable Communications Policy Act
FCC deregulates non-entertainment TV
programming
1986 - Freight Forwarder Deregulation Act
1987 - FCC abolishes Fairness Doctrine
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tion began, principally serving high-density, long-haul
routes with jet aircraft.' 0
Local service airlines were given certificates beginning
in 1943, originally to expand service to small communi-
ties." Eight of these airlines were still in existence by the
time deregulation began, with their role having changed
to include greater provision of longer-haul, higher-
density jet service in larger markets.' 2 These local service
airlines had actually become "mini-trunks," each with a
distinctly regional focus.' 3
Intrastate carriers were allowed to operate scheduled
jet service without CAB certificates, provided they did not
serve interstate routes. By 1978, four of these carriers
were in operation serving the states of California, Florida,
and Texas. 14
Finally, commuter airlines (or air taxis) began service
after World War II, restricted to flying only small piston
or turbo-prop planes on short-haul routes. Although al-
lowed to operate scheduled service, commuters were not
given certificates and were not bound by many CAB regu-
lations. By 1978, there were 258 commuter carriers,
mostly serving smaller communities.' 5
- These ten airlines were: American, Braniff, Continental, Delta, Eastern, Na-
tional, Northwest, Trans World, United, and Western.
11 Vittek, Air Service to Small Communities: The Past, The Present, The Future, 1974
PROC. ANN. MEETING TRANSP. RES. F. 40. The CAB decided to create a new class
of carrier, rather than award the smaller markets to the trunks, based on the per-
ception that survival in these smaller markets would require novel strategies best
undertaken by specialized carriers. The CAB undertook service to small commu-
nities, in spite of the obvious financial difficulties, because of the enthusiasm
shown by the applicants who bid for the routes, and because it felt a need to
promote and encourage civil aeronautics under The 1938 Act. Id.
12 These eight airlines were: Allegheny, Frontier, Hughes Airwest, North Cen-
tral, Ozark, Piedmont, Southern, and Texas International.
,J. MEYER, C. OSTER, I. MORGAN, B. BERMAN & D. STRASSMAN, AIRLINE DEREG-
ULATION: THE EARLY EXPERIENCE 5 (1981). The local service airlines were origi-
nally formed to provide feeder service for the existing trunk lines. The evolution
from feeder airline to operations resembling small trunks resulted from a combi-
nation of growth, government subsidy, and CAB route policies. Id.
" These four airlines were: AirCal, Air Florida, PSA, and Southwest.
I.- BAILEY, supra note 3, at 15. Commuter airlines operated outside the CAB
regulatory structure under a formal exemption granted in 1952. Id. at 14.
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Throughout the regulatory period, a fairly consistent
pattern had emerged regarding the market shares of each
of these carrier classes (See Table 2). As of 1978, the ten
trunk airlines held a dominant position, accounting for
slightly more than 87% of total domestic revenue passen-
ger miles. The largest carriers had retained their domi-
nance during the four decades of economic regulation.
The big four of 1938, United, American, Eastern, and
TWA, were among the big five of 1978, with only Delta
joining their ranks.' 6 Although many trunk airlines had
monopolistic or oligopolistic positions in certain markets
under regulation, the CAB had maintained "just and rea-
sonable" fare levels to insure that prices reflected costs,
thereby preventing the extraction of monopoly profits.
Prior to the passage of the ADA, considerable debate
revolved around the potential of unregulated monopolis-
tic control of markets by the largest carriers. Proponents
of deregulation argued that airline market performance
would approximate perfect competition in a deregulatory
environment, because studies showed no significant econ-
omies of scale existed in airline operations.' 7 The CAB
under Alfred Kahn insisted that the airline industry had
relatively few barriers to entry, that resources were highly
mobile, and that demand was reasonably elastic; there-
fore, there was little reason to fear that deregulation
might result in industry concentration." Another theory
hypothesized that in those cases where there were a lim-
ited number of carriers serving specific markets, the
threat of free entry into those markets would make them
- Dempsey, supra note 4, at 115. One of the reasons the "big four" retained
their dominant position was the entry policy of the CAB. Although the CAB re-
ceived 79 applications between 1950 and 1974 seeking to obtain authority to pro-
vide domestic service, none was granted. Id.
I See Gordon, Airline Costs and Managerial Efficiency, 1965 TRANSP. ECON.: CONF.
U.- NAT'L BUREAU COMMITrEE FOR ECON. RES. 61; White, Economics of Scale and the
Question of "Natural Monopoly" in the Airline Industry, 44 J. AIR L. & CoM. 545 (1979).
- Dempsey, supra note 4, at 130-33.
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Table 2
Airline Industry Domestic Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM)
RPM (000) r Share
1978 1983 1978 1983
Trunk Airlines
United 41,436 43,241 21.5 18.7
American 25,499 31,314 13.2 13.5
Delta 22,850 25,261 11.9 10.9
Eastern 20,770 25,322 10.8 10.9
Trans World 17,960 15,994 9.3 6.9
Western 9,872 8,775 5.1 3.8
Pan Am (& National) 8,952 7,573 4.7 3.3
Continental 8,557 7,751 4.4 3.3
Braniff 7,301 - 3.8
Northwest 5,025 9,441 2.6 4.1
Total 168,222 174,672 87.3 75.4
Local Service Airlines
Republic 6,085 9,675 3.2 4.2
U.S. Air 4,243 7,378 2.2 3.2
Frontier 2,382 3,902 1.2 1.7
Texas International 1,688 - 0.9
Ozark 1,635 2,679 0.8 1.2
Piedmont 1,469 5,169 0.8 2.2
Total 17,503 28,803 9.1 12.5
Intrastate Airlines
PSA 2,478 3,076 1.3 1.3
Southwest 1,049 3,897 0.6 1.7
Air California 813 1,528 0.4 0.7
Air Florida 264 781 0.1 0.3
Total 4,603 9,282 2.4 4.0
Charter Airlines
Capitol 372 1,407 0.2 0.6
World 274 1,726 0.1 0.7
.Vew Carriers
People Express 3,292 - 1.4
Muse 661 - 0.3
New York Air 658 - 0.3
Jet America 618 - 0.3
Midway - 597 - 0.3
Commuter Airlines 1,117 1,953 (1981)0.6 1.0 (1981)
Sources: E. Bailey, D. Graham & D. Kaplan, Deregulating the Airlines 216 (1985);
Civil Aeronautics Board, Air Carrier Traffic Statistics (Dec. 31, 1978), (Dec. 31,
1983).
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"contestable."' 9 Thus, fears of predatory or monopolistic
behavior were ostensibly unwarranted.
Because of these assessments, observers predicted that
many new carriers would enter the industry and challenge
the dominant market share that major trunk carriers pre-
viously enjoyed. This was the Theory of Contestable Mar-
kets, which assumed that if incumbents began to earn
supracompetitive profits, new entrants would be attracted
like sharks to the smell of blood. After all, economic bar-
riers to entry were perceived as being low, and economies
of scale were viewed as nearly nonexistent. Thus, new en-
try, or the threat thereof, would ameliorate the market
power of the unregulated monopolist. In the first few
years following the passage of the ADA, this seemed to be
occurring.
From 1978 through 1983 there was a dramatic increase
in the number of new carriers, most of them being very
small commuter operators. Other new carriers which
emerged during these first years of deregulation were also
able to compete effectively with the former trunk airlines.
These new airlines served mostly short-haul, high-density
markets by offering low-fare, "no-frills" service. Among
these were carriers such as People Express, Midway Air-
lines, New York Air, Jet America, and Muse Air. Although
the market shares of these airlines remained relatively
- See W. BAUMOLJ. PANZAR & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THE-
ORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982). The authors defined a market that is per-
fectly contestable as:
[Olne that is accessible to potential entrants and has the following
two properties: First, the potential entrants can, without restriction,
serve the same market demands and use the same productive tech-
niques as those available to the incumbent firms. Thus, there are not
entry barriers in the sense of the term used by Stigler. Second, the
potential entrants evaluate the profitability of entry at the incumbent
firms' pre-entry prices. That is, although the potential entrants rec-
ognize that an expansion of industry outputs leads to lower prices-
in accord with the market demand curves-the entrants nevertheless
assume that if they undercut incumbents' prices they can sell as
much of the corresponding good as the quantity demanded by the
market at their own prices.
Id. at 5.
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small, they represented the fastest growing segment of
the airline industry in the early years of deregulation (See
Table 2).
Former local service and intrastate airlines also enjoyed
growing market shares from 1978 to 1983. During this
period, Piedmont, Air Florida, and Southwest all had in-
creases in excess of 100% in domestic revenue passenger
miles (RPMs). Former charter airlines, such as World and
Capitol, greatly expanded their route systems, while some
commuter airlines were able to do the same.
As some had predicted, many former trunk airlines ex-
perienced both relative and absolute declines in revenue
passenger miles during the early years of deregulation.
United, Delta, TWA, Western, Continental, and Braniff all
fell into this category, while American exhibited only a
relative decline. These airlines experienced a somewhat
shaky transition into deregulation and were clearly not as
flexible as the new entrants or the other carriers. In spite
of these difficulties, however, the trunk airlines still ac-
counted for over 75% of all domestic RPMs in 1983.
Since the inaugural years of deregulation, profound
changes have occurred which dramatically altered the na-
ture of the industry. The most important of these is the
unprecedented rash of airline mergers and bankruptcies.
The resulting industry consolidation has created a small
class of "megacarriers" that today control an even larger
share of the airline market than they did prior to
deregulation.
In 1978, the six largest United States airlines accounted
for 71% of domestic traffic. In 1983, that figure had de-
clined to 65%, but by 1987, it had dramatically re-
bounded to 79%.20 As indicated above, in the short term,
new competition emerging from deregulation diminished
the dominance by the largest carriers. In recent years,
"-,' Brenner, Airline Deregulation-A, Case Study in Public Policy Failure, 16 TRANSP.
LJ. 179, 184 (1988) (noting that "[flurther concentration must be anticipated,
because some of the remaining carriers are not likely to remain independent for
long.").
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however, unlimited and unprecedented mergers, coupled
with bankruptcies and retrenchments of the smaller air-
lines, has reestablished an oligopoly. The top five carriers
accounted for 54% of revenue passenger miles in 1986,
and only one year later, that figure had jumped to 72%.21
Figure 1 depicts the major mergers and acquisitions which
have occurred since deregulation.
Much criticism has been directed at the Department of
Transportation for approving every merger submitted to
it since it assumed the Civil Aeronautics Board's jurisdic-
tion over mergers, acquisitions, and consolidations upon
the CAB's demise on December 31, 1984.22 For example,
DOT approved Texas Air's acquisition of both People Ex-
press (which included Frontier) and Eastern Airlines
(which included Braniff's Latin American routes),
United's acquisition of Pan Am's transpacific routes,
American's acquisition of AirCal, Delta's acquisition of
Western, Northwest's acquisition of Republic (which itself
was the product of mergers involving North Central,
Southern, and Hughes Airwest), TWA's acquisition of
Ozark, and US Air's acquisition of PSA and Piedmont.
Clearly, these actions sharply increased national levels of
concentration (See Figure 1).
The father of airline deregulation, Alfred Kahn, has
been particularly critical of the Department of Transpor-
tation's permissive approach to airline mergers. Kahn has
written: "They have been permitted by a totally, and in my
view indefensibly, complaisant Department of Transpor-
tation. It is absurd to blame deregulation for this abysmal
dereliction."2 Without question, DOT deserves some se-
vere criticism for its abdication of antitrust responsibility
21 Dempsey, Antitrust Law and Policy in Transportation: Monopoly IS the Name of the
Game, 21 GA. L. REV. 505, 543 (1987) [hereinafter Monopoly IS the Name of the
Game].
- The CAB's jurisdiction was pursuant to section 408 of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958. Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 408, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. app. § 1551(b)(1)(c) (Supp. IV 1986)).
-:' Kahn, Airline Deregulation-Mixed Bag, But a Clear Success Aevertheless, 16
TRANSP. L.J. 229, 234 (1988).
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Figure 1
Major Air Carrier Mergers, Acquisitions, Purchases, and
Consolidations Since Promulgation of the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978.
Market share*
Texas International ---------------- TEXAS AIR 19.0%
Continental ----------------
New York Air --------------------... ..
Frontier ----------- People Express---
Britt --------------------
PBA ----------------------- J
Braniff (Latin American routes)--Eastern-
Rockey Mountain---------------------------
United ------------------------------ UNITED 16.9%
Pan Am (transpacific routes)----------
American ---------------------------- AMERICAN 13.8%
Air Cal ----------------------------- J
Delta ------------------------------- DELTA 12.2%
Western -----------------------------
Northwest --------------------------- NORTHWEST 10.3%
Northwest Central ------- Republic ---- J
Southern -----------------
Hughes Airwest --------------
TWA --------------------------------- TWA 8.2%
Ozark ------------------------------- I




Pan Am ------------------------------ PAN AM 6.3%
National ----------------------------- I
Ransome--------------------------------
* Market share as measured by revenue passenger miles as of July,
1987.
Source: Payne & Tier, What's Standing Between USAir and Piedmont,
Bus. Wk. Oct. 5, 1987, at 40.
Reprinted with permission of the New York Times.
to protect the public from excessive concentration. 4
The merger of Northwest and Republic clearly resulted
in sharply increased levels of concentration at Minneapo-
21 Vonopoly IS the .\ame of the Game, smpra note 21, at 524. Although the DOT has
basically followed a two part analysis inaugurated by the CAB that assesses
whether the proposed transaction could be either anticompetitive or contrary to
the public interest, it has implemented a more narrow assumption that allowing
market forces to operate without needless regulatory interference best serves the
public interest. Id.
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lis/St. Paul and Detroit; and equally clearly, increased
concentration resulted at St. Louis when DOT approved
the merger of TWA with Ozark Airlines. As Table 3
reveals, however, massive hub concentration has occurred
at a large number of cities where no merger had a signifi-
cant impact.
Indeed, the explanation for concentration at all but De-
troit, Minneapolis/St.Paul, and St. Louis is not DOT's
generous approval of airline mergers, but simply the entry
and exit opportunities unleashed by deregulation. Carri-
ers adopting particular cities as hubs have increased fre-
quencies and leased more gates, while incumbent airlines
have quietly exited in favor of market dominance oppor-
tunities of their own in other hub airports. Kahn is there-
fore wrong. Freedom to enter and exit markets is the
heart of deregulation, and it is responsible for concentra-
tion at more hub airports than is the DOT's "abysmal der-
eliction," abysmal though it clearly is. Nonetheless, the
DOT's antitrust delinquency is responsible for national
and regional concentration levels which are unacceptable
and which dampen competition by reducing the number
of competitors in particular city pair markets.
Today, flights originating at or destined to hub cities
may be priced up to 50% more than they would have been
had deregulation not occurred.25 A recent study by the
DOT reveals that fares in seven of nine hub airports stud-
ied increased at a rate faster than the Consumer Price In-
dex during 1985 and 1988.26 Even though city-pairs are
somewhat less concentrated than before deregulation, to-
day nearly two-thirds are monopolies, and 85% are either
monopolies or duopolies.27
One additional observation about concentration levels
pre and post-deregulation is appropriate. Before deregu-
-5 Stockton, IJ'hen Eight Carniers Call the Shots, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988, § 3, at
1, col. 6.
2.; Hamilton, Is the Airline Industry. On the Verge of Going Global, Wash. Post, Dec.
11, 1988, § K, at 1, col. 6.
27 TRAFFIC WORLD, Dec. 5, 1988, at Supp. B. Concentration levels are worse
still since the bankruptcy of Eastern Air Lines in March, 1989.
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Table 3
Single Carrier Concentration at Major Airprts Pre- and Post-Deregulation
Airport 1977 1987
Baltimore/Washington 24.5% US Air 60.0% US Air*
Cincinnati 35.0% Delta 67.6% Delta
Detroit Metropolitan 21.2% Delta 64.9% Northwest
Houston Intercontinental 20.4% Continental 71.5% Continental
Memphis 40.2% Delta 86.7% Northwest
Minneapolis/St. Paul 45.9% Northwest 81.6% Northwest
Nashville Metropolitan 28.2% US Air 60.2% American
Pittsburgh 43.7% US Air 82.8% US Air
St. Louis Lambert 39.1% TWA 82.3% TWA
Salt Lake City 39.6% Western 74.5% Delta
*includes Piedmont
Source: The Big Trouble With Air Travel, 54 CONSUMER REP. 362-67 (June 1988).
Copyright 1988 by Consumers Union of United States, Inc., Mount Vernon,
N.Y. 10553. Excerpted by permission from Consumer Reports, June 1988.
lation, a high level of concentration could be tolerated be-
cause fare levels were regulated; even a monopolist could
not reap monopoly profits from a market, or engage in
predatory pricing to drive a new entrant out, because the
CAB regulated rates, ensuring that they were "just and
reasonable." In a post-deregulation environment, how-
ever, these high levels of concentration are a matter of
serious concern, for the regulatory mechanism which for-
merly shielded consumers from price gouging has been
eradicated by deregulation, and the Theory of Contesta-
ble Markets seems not to have been sustained by the em-
pirical evidence of deregulation. Instead, there appear
to be significant economies of scale in the airline industry.
For several reasons, it is unlikely that a new entrant will
emerge to rival the megacarriers. First, the infrastructure
of gates, terminal facilities, and landing slots are practi-
cally unavailable. At the nation's four busiest airports,
Chicago O'Hare, Washington National, and New York's
LaGuardia and Kennedy, all landing slots have been con-
- See Brenner, supra note 20, at 194-95; Monopoly IS the Name of the Game, supra
note 21, at 510-47; Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theol', Firm
Strategy, and Public Polic y, 4 YALEJ. ON REG. 393, 403-08 (1987); Moore, US. Airline
Deregulation: Its Effects on Passenger, Capital, and Labor, 29 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 5-23
(1986).
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sumed. Over 67% of U.S. airports have no gates to lease
to a new entrant. 29 Even if an incumbent would be willing
to lease a gate to an upstart airline, and few are willing to
do so at their hub airports, it could nevertheless charge
monopoly rents. The DOT decision to allow carriers to
buy and sell landings slots means that the deeper pocket
carriers can purchase market share, and thereby enjoy the
market power to reap oligopoly profits.3
Second, the largest airlines today own the largest com-
puter reservations systems. Many critics have argued that
such vertical integration not only offers incumbents the
potential to enjoy a higher page display on the computer
reservations screens used by travel agents to sell most
flights,3  but also gives incumbents superior access to
market information, with which they can manage yield by
adjusting the number of discounted seats on an hourly ba-
sis depending on passenger demand.3 2 Moreover, the ad-
vantages of being listed in the computer as an "on line"
connection with one of the major airlines has led forty-
eight of the fifty largest commuter air carriers to affiliate
themselves with the megacarriers, renaming their compa-
nies and repainting their aircraft in megacarrier colors.3
The small carriers have become, in effect, franchisees of
the behemoths of the industry, and are therefore an un-
likely source from which new competition will spring.34
Third, large airlines have more attractive frequent flyer
programs that serve as a lure to business travelers, the
most lucrative segment of the market. Brand loyalty
'-1, Hardaway, The FAA "Buy-Sell" Slot Rule: Airline Deregulation at the Crossroads, 52
J. AIR. L. & CoM. 1, 49 (1986).
! See id. at 25-30 (discussing the economic value of the buy-sell method of allo-
cating landing slots).
:1 See Comment, The Antitrust Inplications of Computer Reservation Systems (CRS's),
51 J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 158 (1985) (discussing screen bias and its role in favor-
ing one airline's flights over another).
32 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION IMPACT OF COMPUT-
ERIZED RESERVATION SYSTEMS 11 (1986) ("CRS owning airlines can use their supe-
rior access to marketing data to fine-tune their marketing strategies .... ").
:1:. United Express, Continental Express, and Northwest Air Link are examples
of this trend.
:.. See Deregulation's Falling Stars, OAG FREQUENT FLYER, Aug. 1988, at 28.
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makes it difficult for a new rival to find a niche, particu-
larly when its frequent flyer program offers free travel to
decidedly less exotic destinations. 5 That, coupled with
commission overrides for travel agents, gives incumbents
a decided advantage. 6
Fourth, although new entrants enjoyed significantly
lower labor costs in the inaugural years of deregulation,
the squeeze on carrier profits unleashed by deregulation
has forced management to exact serious concessions in
terms of labor wages and work rules. Some airlines, like
Continental and TWA, have effectively destroyed unions
that refused to make such concessions. Thus, the margin
of labor costs and productivity between a new entrant and
an established airline has been substantially narrowed.3 7
Finally, with 150 airlines filing for bankruptcy since
1978, investor confidence in new airline ventures has
evaporated .3  Hence, significant new entry is highly un-
likely in the deregulated airline industry.
IV. AIR SERVICE
When examining changes in air service, it is important
to note that there are many dimensions of "service."
Likewise, there are several means of assessing these
changes. In this analysis, the focus is on both the quanti-
tative and qualitative aspects of changes in the frequency
and type of air service, air fares, and on-time perform-
ance. It is also important to remember that, although
proponents of deregulation emphasize the lower fares
available to consumers in many markets, if the level of ser-
vice they now purchase has declined significantly, we may
be comparing apples with oranges.
'MonopolV IS the Name of the Game, supra note 21, at 596.
See Rose, TravelAgents' Games Raise Ethics Issue, Wall St.J., Nov. 23, 1988, § B,
at 1, col. 3 (discussing how commission overrides and sales based incentives influ-
ence travel agents to "steer" customers to a particular air carrier).
Monopoly IS the Name of the Game, supra note 21, at 596-97.
See Russell, Flying Among the Merger Clouds, TIME, Sept. 29, 1986, at 56, 57.
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A. Service Frequency
Under regulation, trunk and local service air carriers
were required to possess CAB certificates of "pubic con-
venience and necessity" for every route they served.3 9
The CAB generally practiced a policy of awarding routes
to carriers with the purpose of dividing markets into sys-
tems.4 0  Airlines were awarded mixtures of higher and
lower density routes so as to allow for cross-subsidization
of the less profitable routes with profits earned from more
lucrative markets.4 ' Because of the need for back-up mar-
kets to increase load factors on nonstop flights, patterns
of predominantly linear route structures emerged.4
With deregulation, the CAB lost the authority to award
routes,. so that now all carriers which are fit, willing, and
able may serve any domestic route.43 Airlines quickly
adapted to the new environment by developing "hub-and-
spoke" route structures in order to accommodate larger
volumes of traffic from an increased number of city-pairs.
Indeed, creating a hub system has a multiplier effect on
the number of origins and destinations a carrier serves.
Each major airline developed hub facilities at strategic
points in its air service network to funnel passengers from
:... For a detailed analysis of the traditional entry criteria used by the CAB in
determining route service, see Dempsey, supra note 4, at 108-14.
I. BAILEY, supra note 3, at 11-13. The CAB, however, never established a com-
prehensive mapping system, relying primarily on piecemeal connection efforts,
through route extensions and mergers. Id. at 12. Furthermore, the route award
system was biased towards existing carriers because of their proven record. Id.
As a result, merger of a new airline with an old and failing one provided the
cheapest way into the market. Id. at 13.
Dempsey, supra note 4, at 112-13.
M. BRENNER,J. LEET & E. ScHoTr, AIRLINE DEREGULATION 75 (1985) [herein-
after AIRLINE DEREGULATION] ("[T]he airline rate structure evolved gradually into
many 'linear' patterns, in which one city would mainly serve as back-up to some
specific route segment, while other cities would back up other routes .... ).
:' Entry into most international markets, however, continues to be regulated.
See P. DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AvIATION 65-69 (1987).
For example, countries regulate entry into their markets with bilateral air trans-
port agreements which establish regulatory schemes for commercial air service
between the countries. Id. at 47. These agreements may be in the form of "trea-
ties, inter-governmental agreements, executive agreements, conventions, proto-
col and exchange of diplomatic notes." Id. at 47 n. 1.
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many origins into a hub and then quickly fly the passen-
gers out to their desired destinations. Thus, those cities
with hub operations became centers of very highly con-
centrated passenger traffic and flight frequencies (See Ta-
ble 4).
Table 4

















Airlines 76 Growth (1978-84)
Delta, Eastern + 28.6%
Piedmont + 94.2
Piedmont + 134.2
United, American' + 10.0
American, Delta + 52.2
Piedmont + 65.9
United, Continental + 30.6
Northwest + 44.5
Southwest, Texas Air + 85.1
Northwest + 60.1
Texas Air +114.2
US Air + 21.6
TWA + 56.2
Delta + 51.9
Sources: Brenner, Airline Deregulation-A Case Study in Public Policy Failure, 16
TRANSP. L.J. 179, 190 (1988); CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, REPORT ON AIRLINE
SERVICE, FARES, TRAFFIC, LOAD FACTORS, AND MARKET SHARES 29 (June 1, 1984).
Along with these cities serving airline hub functions,
large and medium-sized cities in general have exper-
ienced higher volumes of service frequency since the be-
ginning of deregulation. Using the FAA size classification
scheme, 4 the large and medium hub size classes have had
more substantial increases in the number of weekly depar-
" Hub size classes were defined by the CAB and the FAA as follows: a large
hub is a city and its metropolitan area which enplanes at least 1.00% of the total
number of U.S. certificated airline passengers per year; a medium hub enplanes
between 0.25 and 0.999%; a small hub enplanes between 0.05 and 0.249%; and a
non hub enplanes less than 0.05%. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION & RE-
SEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION, AIRPORT ACTIVITY STATISTICS OF
CERTIFICATED ROUTE AIR CARRIERS at iv (1987).
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tures and weekly seats than either the small or non-hub
classes from 1978 through 1987 (See Table 5). These in-
creases have resulted in an industry-wide growth in both
measures throughout the deregulatory period.
During the hearings evaluating the merits of deregula-
tion, one of the chief concerns was the expected impact
on service to smaller communities. Many observers
feared that free exit from any route might result in a total
loss of service to many small towns. In the past, the CAB
protected small town service by the use of subsidies, and
through stringent exit requirements.4 5 In an attempt to
appease these apprehensions, the ADA included provi-
sions for ten years of guaranteed Essential Air Service
(EAS)4 6 to all communities on the 1978 certificated route
network. Despite this provision, many observers re-
mained apprehensive about the future of small commu-
nity service.
The empirical evidence suggests that since the begin-
ning of deregulation, small cities have indeed been nega-
tively impacted. In terms of both flight departures and
seating capacities, the smallest communities (nonhubs)
have experienced absolute declines (See Table 5). In
1978, nonhubs accounted for 23% of all departures; by
1987, they accounted for only 16%. Furthermore, de-
clines in seating capacity relative to departures indicate a
shift in the type of service provision from jet aircraft to
commuter airline turboprop aircraft.47 This change has
resulted in a reduction in service comfort and reliability
and has created an impression that overall service quality
has deteriorated.
I." Beitel, CAB Rules for Essential Air Service, AIRPORT SERVICES MGMT, June 1980,
at 15, 16. Under CAB administration, when an airline chose to discontinue ser-
vice to a city, that airline was required to "render 'essential service' . . . until a
substitute could be found .... Id. at 15.
- The CAB defined EAS as being at least two daily round trips, five days a week
to the nearest convenient small, medium, or large hub. Id.
17 See id. ("Aircraft must be sufficient for passengers and baggage but not
freight. They must be multi-engine with two pilots. Pressurization and air condi-
tioning are not required. The cabin must be accessible by stairs; not over-the-wing
steps.").
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Table 5
Changes in Frequency of Air Service by Size Classification
June 1978 -June 1987
Size Flights/Week Percent Seats/Week (000) Percent
Class I978 I987 C 1978 1987 Change
Large 63,484 103,063 +62.3% 7,104 12,132 +70.8%
Medium 19,731 30,712 +55.7% 1,953 3,031 +55.2%
Small 13,256 18,806 +41.9% 1,112 1,405 +26.3%
Nonhub 29,543 29,271 - 0.9% 1,175 971 -17.4%
Total 126,014 181,852 +44.3% 11,344 17,539 +54.6%
Source: Brenner, Airline Deregulation-A Case Study in Public Policy Failure, 16
TRANSP. L.J. 179, 211 (1988).
On a more disaggregated level, many individual com-
munities have undergone drastic service curtailments or
complete service withdrawals. Out of the 515 nonhub
communities receiving air service in 1978, 313 (60.8%)
had declines in flight frequencies by 1987, with 144 (28%)
of these cases resulting in a complete loss of service, and
only 32 (6.2%) enjoying the initiation of new service.4 8
Some commentators have asserted that airline deregu-
lation has resulted in significant economic benefits to the
consuming public. A Brookings Institution study ambi-
tiously maintained that this savings was as much as $6 bil-
lion, comprised of fare discounts and opportunity cost
savings realized as a result of "improved service conven-
ience [to business travelers] attributable to the acceler-
ated development of hub-and-spoke operations and to
frequency improvements in low-density markets. ' '49 The
overall import of the study was that airline service had not
" See CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, REPORT ON AIRLINE SERVICE, FARES, TRAFFIC,
LOAD FACTORS, AND MARKET SHARES 32 (Sept. 1, 1984). Since this data is no
longer reported by the CAB, it has been updated to June, 1987 from information
reported in the Official Airline Guide. OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE (June 1, 1987); see
also A. Goetz, The Effect of Airline Deregulation on Air Service to Small and
Medium-Sized Communities: Case Studies in Northeastern Ohio 35 (1987) (Ph.D.
Dissertation).
"- S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, supra note 9, at 33. The study in question calcu-
lated the effects of deregulation on three different classes of travelers: low income
pleasure travelers, high income pleasure travelers and business travelers. Each
classification was then weighted for its share of air traffic before computing the
total annual benefit to all travelers. Id.
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declined since deregulation began, but, because of addi-
tional frequencies, had actually improved. 51
By focusing on the number of flights in larger markets
as the dominant measure of airline service, these authors
appear to have missed the problems frequent flyers see.
Whatever the improvements in the rate structure since de-
regulation, most of the literature written about airlines in
this environment concludes that service has declined sig-
nificantly. A recent consumer survey reveals that almost
50% of those asked thought airline service had declined
since deregulation; less than 20% said service had im-
proved.5' The complaints include: late departures,
crowded seating, long lines at check-in, unappetizing
food, overbooked aircraft, and an unacceptably long wait
for baggage.52 Even the DOT's data reveal that consumer
complaints about airline delays, congestion, overbooking,
bumping, missed connections, lost baggage, cancella-
tions, and deteriorating food have soared in recent
years.53 A recent editorial in the Washington Post summed
up what many firmly perceive to be the results of deregu-
lation: "Airline Service Has Gone to Hell." 54
Admittedly some consumers are paying less for air ser-
vice than they did before deregulation. Those who have
benefitted most are vacation (discretionary) travelers in
large markets served by several carriers. Business travel-
ers flying between small towns served by only a single car-
rier have not benefitted from fare reductions. Today,
-, Id. at 1-3 ("The accelerated development of the hub-and-spoke operations
has enabled carriers to use labor and equipment more efficiently and to provide
more convenient service.")
." The Big Trouble llth Air Travel, 54 CONSUMER REP. 362-63 (June 1988).
52 Id.
':, Brenner, supra note 20, at 215-16. During the first five months of 1987, con-
sumer complaints to the DOT regarding service increased by 81% over the appli-
cable period in the preceding year. Id. As a result, the Secretary of
Transportation called on the airlines to reduce the level of dissatisfaction among
passengers, threatening referral to an enforcement officer if improvements were
not made. Id.
- Rowen, Airline Service Has Gone to Hell, Wash. Post, July 23, 1987, § A, at 21,
col. 1 (Rowen also questions safety considerations and calls for a reexamination of
deregulation).
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both the vacation traveler and the businessman are often
routed through a circuitous hub connection, causing each
to spend more time in aircraft and airports. The result is
a decidedly less pleasurable consumption of time than
before deregulation. Arguably the opportunity costs have
increased since deregulation began, and airline service
purchased today is a lesser product for the money.
Why has the market not corrected this deterioration in
service? Some suggest that service deterioration is attrib-
utable to the decline in profitability of firms caused by the
"destructive competition" unleashed by deregulation.55
Hence, carriers do not have the resources to staff flights
with more flight attendants than required by FAA mini-
mums, to staff ticket counters or baggage areas ade-
quately, to provide better food, to avoid deliberate
overbooking or unrealistic scheduling, or even to clean an
aircraft properly. While some airlines are worse than
others, the decline appears to be universal.
Another explanation of the market's failure may be re-
flected in the nature of the item being sold. When a con-
sumer purchases a manufactured product, he can examine
it in a retail store before he spends his money, pull it off
the shelf and turn it over, and make some assessment of
its quality. When a consumer buys a service like transpor-
tation, however, its definition beyond a crude description
of "the movement of my body from point A to point B" is
more amorphous.
When booking a flight, most consumers do some price
shopping. Where a competitive alternative exists, there
has been some measure of pricing competition under de-
regulation, and those who price shop usually opt for the
lower fare. Frequent flyers who have been through the
ordeal of a hub connection may ask for a nonstop if one is
available, or a direct one-stop, if one is not. Beyond that
type of consumer inquiry, how many also ask (1) what
kind of aircraft is being flown, how old is it, and when was
-,-, Brenner, supra note 20, at 201.
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it last overhauled; (2) how often is this flight late, and by
how much, on average; (3) by what percentage of passen-
gers do you usually overbook the flight; (4) what percent-
age of bags are usually lost on the flight, and if you don't
lose them, how long will I have to wait at the destination
for my bags; (5) how many flight attendants are on board;
(6) what's for dinner, and how tasty is it; (7) what's the
average wait in the line in the airport; (8) how crowded is
the flight and the waiting lounge at the gate; (9) how
much knee and leg room do you give me between seats;
and (10) how comfortable is the seat? Because most of
these questions are not asked by consumers before they
purchase their ticket, the market has not responded to
consumer desires for better service.
The U.S. Department of Transportation has authority
to protect consumers from many of these evils, including
deliberate overbooking, unrealistic scheduling, and fraud-
ulent and misleading ("bait and switch") advertising. 56
The Reagan Administration, however, was reluctant to do
much of anything to correct market failure.
Another consideration which increasingly impacts both
service and fare levels is the level of industry concentra-
tion which has emerged from deregulation. With fewer
carriers, with some traffic lanes and hubs now a monopoly
or duopoly, and with no government agency to protect
consumers, it is quite likely that as time passes, prices will
rise and service will decline even further.
B. Air Fares
One of the driving forces in the move to deregulate the
airlines was the belief that air fares would be substantially
reduced, thus benefitting the consumer. The contention
was that regulation created inadequate pricing and exces-
-., See 49 U.S.C. § 1374 (1982) (duty of air carriers to provide reasonable service
in air transportation and duty not to make any unreasonable preference to any
person); 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982) (authority given to Secretary of Transportation
to investigate methods of competition in the sale of air transportation and to or-
der air carriers to cease deceptive practices).
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sive service competition resulting in higher-than-neces-
sary fares. Proponents of deregulation believed that
increased competition would bring lower fares.
Between 1978 and 1986, the industry-wide yield per
passenger-mile (in constant dollars) declined by 2.6% per
year. This would seem to indicate that average fare levels
have also been declining since the beginning of deregula-
tion. Under deregulation, however, most routing is via
circuitous hub cities rather than nonstops. Measurement
of passenger-mile yield, therefore, provides a distorted
measure of the benefits of deregulation. Travelers are fly-
ing longer distances between city pairs than before dereg-
ulation. This has the effect of lowering the yield per
passenger-mile without necessarily lowering the average
fare.5 7
The average yield per passenger-mile decline also
masks very wide disparities in fare levels in different mar-
kets (See Table 6). Fare reductions have been most ap-
parent in many large and medium-size markets where
intense fare competition exists between or among differ-
ent airlines. In smaller markets or in those where the
number of competitors has been reduced, fares have gen-
erally risen. In some cases fares have increased more than
300% (in absolute dollars) from 1978 to 1988. Hence,
there appears to be widespread discrimination in pricing
under deregulation, with the level of prices in any particu-
lar market exhibiting a correlation with the level of com-
petition rather than marginal costs of providing service.
Furthermore, since levels of competition are significantly
lower than those anticipated, the momentum for pricing
appears to be upward.
C. On-Time Performance
Another attribute of service quality is on-time perform-
ance. Under regulation, this was not a major issue as pas-
sengers generally expected and received reasonably
57 Brenner, supra note 20, at 198.
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(June 1, 1978); OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE (June
Notes
The Consumer Price Index from 1978 to 1986 rose by 68%. Assuming a 75%
rise by 1988, percent fare increases greater than that would indicate real fare
increases in constant dollars.
The 1978 coach fare (in 1978 dollars) was the lowest Y-class fare available in
June 1978.
The 1988 discount fare (in 1988 dollars) was the lowest fare available in
June 1988. Many of these discount fares had restrictions or limitations on their
use, e.g. 30-day advance purchase or Saturday night stayover.
The 1988 coach fare (in 1988 dollars) was the lowest Y-class fare available in
June 1988.
punctual air service. With deregulation, and the airlines'
near universal adoption of hub-and-spoke route struc-
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tures, congestion and delays have become inevitable, es-
pecially at the largest hub airports.
The very nature of hub-and-spoke systems requires that
airlines concentrate as many incoming and outgoing
flights in as narrow a window of time and space as possi-
ble in order to maximize the total number of city-pair
combinations that can be effectively served through a hub
airport. Before the DOT required publication of delay
statistics, carriers also had an incentive to engage in un-
realistic scheduling of the shortest possible origin and
destination times because that would raise a flight's visi-
bility to the first page of the computer reservation system
(CRS) screen display, where most flights are sold by travel
agents. Hence, clustering of arrivals and departures may
bear no correlation to an airport's or air traffic control
system's capacity to handle them.
Because each airline independently schedules these
hub-and-spoke flights, even the largest airports' capacities
have been overtaxed. For example, in 1987, at Atlanta's
Hartsfield Airport, the 9:00 a.m. crunch was illustrated by
the airlines' scheduling of 32 arrivals in 15 minutes,
whereas its optimum capacity was 21 arrivals in 15 min-
utes.58 As a result of such saturation, delays occur and
ripple throughout the entire national system of air
transport.
Delays have been on the rise since the beginning of de-
regulation, but the most recent years have been the worst.
Delays in 1986 increased by 25% over 1985 at the na-
tion's large hub airports, and increased another 13% in
1987. 5 9 The traveling public tolerated delays through the
early years of deregulation, perhaps accepting some de-
gree of trade-off between service quality and lower fares.
.- Morganthau, Year of the .ear Miss, NEWSWEEK, July 27, 1987, at 20, 24. The
FAA monitors the nationwide air traffic flow. Sometimes the saturation results can
be minimized. At other times, the delay effects of such scheduling cannot be
avoided. Id.
.- Brenner, supra note 20, at 212 ("It has been estimated that U.S. airlines incur
an average of 2,000 hours of delay, and that the value of time lost by passengers is
equivalent to about one billion per year.").
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By 1987, however, the situation had grown so intolerable
that a massive consumer backlash occurred, exemplified
by an unprecedented number of complaints.60
In response to the growing public disenchantment with
the airlines' on-time performance, the DOT in late 1987
began requiring airlines to disclose their on-time per-
formance records, so that consumers could now choose
among airlines on that basis. 6' Since these records have
been made public, on-time performances have generally
improved, although certain airlines have remained delin-
quent (See Table 7). Most of the recent improvements,
however, may be attributed to the carriers' practice of ad-
ding time to schedules, rather than to shaving actual
transit time.
V. AIR SAFETY
For all air travelers, air safety is a prerequisite that can-
not be compromised. Since 1958, the FAA has main-
tained primary responsibility for air safety, although the
CAB (now DOT) held authority to issue operating
licenses to airlines deemed "fit, willing, and able," with
safety being a major component of the fitness evalua-
tion. 62 During the deregulation debate, there was consid-
erable concern expressed about the potential impact on
air safety stemming from the removal of economic regula-
tory restraints. Scenarios were fashioned where the strain
of competitive pressure would entice airlines to "cut cor-
ners" on safety in order to save time and money.63
,;, See supra note 53 and accompanying text for a discussion of consumer com-
plaints to the DOT.
- See 14 C.F.R. § 234 (1988). Section 234.4(a) provides that "[elach reporting
carrier shall file [a report] with the Department's Office of Aviation Information
Management (OAIM), on a monthly basis setting forth information for each of its
reportable flights .... Id. at § 234.4(a).
62 See 42 U.S.C. § 1424 (1982) (empowering the FAA Administrator to issue
operating certificates); 14 C.F.R. § 121 (1988) (providing the specifications which
must be met before an operating certificate is issued).
,;:, AIR DEREGULATION, supra note 42, at 125. The fear was that airlines would
cut "maintenance, training, and operations" corners to lower costs. Id, The two
most expensive items a carrier must contend with are fuel and labor. Id.
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Table 7
On-Time Arrival Performances of Airlines and Airports: 1987-88*
SEP 87 DEC 87 FEB 88 4PR 88
Carmers 76 Rank ro Rank r% Rank re Rank
Alaska 79.8 (6) 59.2 (13) 76.9 (6) 77.7 (12)
American 84.5 (1) 73.1 (4) 80.8 (4) 85.0 (5)
American West 73.5 (10) 76.4 (2) 88.7 (2) 90.8 (2)
Continental 81.1 (3) 60.5 (2) 67.7 (13) 81.5 (8)
Delta 72.3 (11) 61.8 (11) 73.6 (9) 85.6 (4)
Eastern 80.4 (4) 69.5 (6) 70.6 (11) 75.5 (14)
Northwest 69.0 (13) 63.3 (9) 61.7 (14) 84.2 (6)
Pacific SW 70.5 (12) 57.6 (14) 90.6 (1) 91.1 (1)
Pan American 74.3 (9) 77.3 (1) 80.1 (5) 76.5 (13)
Piedmont 80.3 (5) 67.2 (7) 75.0 (7) 81.0 (10)
Southwest 82.4 (2) 74.2 (3) 88.5 (3) 90.3 (3)
TWA 78.4 (8) 63.5 (8) 69.4 (12) 81.5 (8)
United 79.2 (7) 62.6 (10) 73.2 (10) 81.8 (7)
US Air 67.4 (14) 71.9 (5) 74.8 (8) 77.9 (11)
Total 77.1 66.4 74.7 82.6
Airports
Atlanta 82.4 (3) 70.1 (11) 75.3 (11) 83.6 (10)
Boston 69.5 (22) 71.2 (10) 70.9 (17) 67.7 (26)
Charlotte 85.1 (1) 71.9 (7) 80.7 (3) 84.9 (7)
Wash. National 74.1 (16) 73.7 (4) 75.7 (9) 78.3 (23)
Denver 81.9 (5) 52.4 (25) 66.6 (24) 82.0 (13)
Dallas 84.5 (2) 67.4 (16) 79.1 (4) 85.9 (4)
Detroit 69.3 (23) 68.8 (13) 64.0 (26) 83.6 (11)
Newark 76.2 (13) 69.2 (12) 72.1 (15) 76.4 (24)
Hous.-Intercont. 80.6 (8) 56.3 (23) 68.9 (20) 78.5 (22)
New York-JFK 68.8 (24) 74.3 (2) 74.9 (12) 67.6 (27)
Las Vegas 76.7 (10) 68.2 (14) 82.9 (1) 84.3 (8)
Los Angeles 70.4 (21) 53.1 (24) 76.2 (7) 81.9 (14)
NY-LaGuardia 75.1 (14) 74.7 (1) 76.0 (8) 79.3 (20)
Orlando 74.0 (18) 72.4 (5) 62.7 (27) 79.9 (19)
Memphis 78.4 (9) 68.2 (15) 66.8 (23) 86.7 (2)
Miami 74.1 (17) 74.0 (3) 71.6 (16) 82.1 (12)
Minn./St. Paul 74.8 (15) 61.1 (20) 66.2 (25) 85.7 (5)
Chicago-O'Hare 80.9 (7) 66.5 (17) 68.7 (21) 80.6 (18)
Philadelphia 68.5 (25) 72.0 (6) 74.2 (13) 79.1 (21)
Phoenix 72.2 (19) 65.6 (18) 82.8 (2) 86.7 (3)
Pittsburgh 67.3 (26) 71.4 (9) 77.2 (6) 81.6 (16)
San Diego 71.7 (20) 57.1 (22) 77.9 (5) 81.8 (15)
Seattle 76.5 (12) 51.5 (26) 69.3 (18) 80.9 (17)
San Francisco 65.3 (27) 41.8 (27) 75.6 (10) 68.4 (25)
Salt Lake City 81.5 (6) 60.0 (21) 74.1 (14) 90.6 (1)
St. Louis 82.0 (4) 64.8 (19) 69.1 (19) 85.0 (6)
Tampa 76.7 (11) 71.7 (8) 67.8 (22) 84.2 (9)
* The DOT counts only non-mechanical delays greater than 15 mins.
Source: Office of Consumer Affairs, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AIR
TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORTS, (Nov. 1987), (FEB. 1988), (APR. 1988), (JUNE 1988).
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Indeed, since 1978 the issue of air safety has been de-
monstrably cast into the spotlight. Increased air traffic
and congestion, especially at the largest hub airports,
have helped to create conditions that are overtaxing the
current air traffic control system. Reports of near midair
collisions and potentially serious errors by air traffic con-
trollers have risen from 1985 through 1987.64 Public con-
cern over air safety has reached unprecedented levels, as
measured by surveys and complaints registered at the
FAA during 1987, the so-called "Year of the Near-
Miss." ' 65
Despite this seemingly deteriorating situation, the
number of actual fatal air accidents has decreased under
deregulation. From 1965 to 1975 there were forty-two fa-
tal U.S. commercial airline accidents; but from 1976 to
1986, there were only fifteen.66 The number of fatalities
per 100,000 hours flown has dropped from 1.72 in 1978
to 0.92 in 1986.67 Thus, some observers maintain that
economic deregulation has not led to deterioration in air
safety. These same individuals, however, recognize that
the increased volume of traffic caused by deregulation has
created conditions which may erode safety levels in the
future unless precautions are taken.
Because of the competitive pressures unleashed by de-
regulation, overall financial performances have declined
to the point of inadequacy, despite the fact that the reces-
sion of the early 1980s has abated, and fuel prices have
fallen. In many instances, these competitive pressures
have had beneficial impacts upon carrier productivity be-
cause management has been forced to engage in hard ne-
gotiations to reduce labor costs and inefficient work rules.
The implementation of airline industry cost cutting,
however, may well have had a deleterious impact on the
Loepp, High An.xiety and Rage, TiME, July 20, 1987, at 53.
Morganthau, supra note 58, at 20.
Morrison & Winston, Air Safety, Deregulation, and Public Policy, BOOKINGS REV.,
Winter 1988, at 10, 11.
- Morganthau, supra note 58, at 21-22.
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margin of safety. According to the DOT, the amount of
resources devoted by airlines to aircraft maintenance fell
30% during deregulation's first six years. 68 A survey of
commercial airline pilots reveals that almost half believe
their companies defer maintenance for an excessive pe-
riod of time.69 Today, most carriers lack the resources to
replace their aging fleets of aircraft. As a consequence,
the average age of the industry's jets grew "21% since
1979 to 12.53 years" in 1988; more than half of the 2,767
jets in service were 16 years old or older.70
The new low fares which airlines offered in larger, com-
petitive markets during the last decade have stimulated
significant new passenger demand. Between 1978 and
1987, departures for the major airlines increased by
27%. 7 1 This increase in flights, coupled with the indus-
try's practice of adopting hub-and-spoke route systems
has congested the flight paths of the nation's major air-
ports during peak periods. As a consequence, near misses
are soaring. There were 584 near misses during 1984,
758 in 1985, 839 in 1986, and 610 for the first half of
1987 alone.72
The resulting increase in airspace congestion has
placed serious strains on the air traffic control system at a
time when it is least capable of handling the surge in de-
mand. In 1981, President Reagan fired 11,000 members
of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization
(PATCO) for striking, depleting it to only a third of its
work force, which has not yet been completely replaced by
- Fischetti & Perry, Our Burdened Skies, 23 IEEE SPECTRUM 36, 79 (1986) ("The
carriers now spend close to twice as much on marketing as they do on mainte-
nance; according to the DOT, in 1977 the amounts were approximately equal.").
-;.. Duffy, Viewfrom Cockpit Is Clearly ANegative, Denver Post, Dec. 7, 1987, § E, at 2,
col. 3.
7., Valente, Harris & McGinley, Should Airlines Scrap Their Oldest Planes for Sake of
Safety?, Wall St.J., May 6, 1988, § I at 1, col. 6.
71 Kilpatrick, Skies Safe Today, But Turbulence is Brewing, Rocky Mountain News,
May 4, 1988, at 37, col.. 1.
, Increasing .Vear-.Ilidair Incidents Spur Drive to Iprove ATC Peifornance, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 24, 1987, at 21.
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the FAA.7 3 Not only is the system understaffed, but many
airports and navigational facilities are equipped with ob-
solete and aging equipment.7 4 Operational errors, or mis-
takes by controllers, increased 20% during the first half of
1987 over the same period one year earlier.75
The level of public and media concern over the
trimmed margin of safety has increased pressure on the
FAA to become more vigilant in enforcing its safety regu-
lation mandate, something it was lethargic in doing dur-
ing the early years of the Reagan Administration.
Recently, significant fines have been levied on the major
airlines. Even the father of deregulation, Alfred Kahn,
now admits that the margin of safety has "possibly" nar-
rowed since 1978, although fatality statistics do not yet
reflect it.
71
There seems to be widespread agreement that the cur-
rent air system infrastructure, including airports, runways,
and the air traffic control system, is in dire need of expan-
sion and enhancement. No new airports have been con-
structed in the U.S. since Dallas-Ft. Worth International
in 1974, nor has there been any major airport capacity ex-
pansion since the 1980 reconfiguration of Hartsfield In-
ternational in Atlanta. Further, the current national radar
and detection system has been criticized as being anti-
quated and inadequate.7 7 This situation exists in spite of
- Morganthau, supra note 58, at 20.
7 See Fischetti & Perry, supra note 68, at 38 (analyzing the U.S. air traffic control
(ATC) system that is made up of increasingly aging radios, radar, and computers).
7-, Molinari, How Safe Is the Air Traffic Control System?, USA Today, Nov. 12, 1987,
at 12.
Kahn, supra note 23, at 251. Kahn explained that:
There have of course been severe problems and reasons for concern
even from the public's standpoint [since deregulation]: most promi-
nently sharply increased congestion and delays, increased concen-
tration at hubs, monopolistic exploitation of a minority of
customers, and possibly a narrowing of the margin of safety, even
though actual accident rates have run consistently 35-40 percent be-
low pre-deregulation levels.
Id.
I7 See Fischetti & Perry, supra note 68, at 38. After interviewing dozens of air
traffic controllers, the authors found "that ATC equipment is not working as well
now as it did five years ago. The reasons for this are obvious. The equipment is
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FAA forecasts of continuing growth in nationwide air
traffic.
Clearly, in the current deregulatory environment, wide-
spread concern exists about air safety. Although accident
statistics suggest that commercial air transportation is
safer now than it was under regulation, the common pub-
lic perception is that it is now less safe to fly. Perhaps
evidence of instability and turmoil in the airline industry's
structure and level of service, has created an atmosphere
of uncertainty among the traveling public about air travel
in general, and especially air safety. Dramatic changes are
necessary to restore public confidence in the efficacy and
safety of air travel.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This article has examined a variety of profound changes
in the U.S. airline industry over the last ten years brought
about by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, and the
Reagan Administration's enthusiastic implementation of
deregulation. In terms of the airline industry structure,
air service, and air safety, the past decade has been very
turbulent. We have witnessed both increased industry
and service concentration among the largest airlines and
airports, and increased volatility in industry structure, ser-
vice, and safety.
Prior to deregulation, the airline industry maintained a
relatively stable structure consisting principally of trunk
and local service carriers. Despite the high market share
concentration by the trunks, the CAB ensured "just and
reasonable" fares and a high level of service to all markets
dense and thin, and to all communities, large and small.
In the first few years after deregulation, a proliferation of
new carriers reduced the trunk airlines' domination of the
industry. For those who argued in favor of airline deregu-
lation, the increased price competition brought about by
getting older and not being replaced. It is handling more traffic. And it is being
asked to make up for a shortage of traffic controllers .... Id.
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new market entrants, such as Sir Freddie Laker's Skytrain
or Donald Burr's People Express, was precisely the type
of benefit they expected.
More recently, however, the airline industry has exper-
ienced a return to a tight oligopoly, contributed to by
mergers and acquisitions allowed by a complaisant Rea-
gan Administration Department of Transportation. 7 The
top six megacarriers now account for nearly 80% of the
industry's revenue passenger miles. The top eight account
for 94% of domestic traffic.79 Moreover, these carriers
are no longer subject to CAB fare regulation, so that if
they attain monopoly control in certain hub and city-pair
markets, there is nothing to stop them from charging mo-
nopoly prices, contestability theory notwithstanding.
The impacts on air service have been equally dramatic.
Since the beginning of deregulation, air service has be-
come more frequent and less expensive in only the most
competitive city-pair markets. In terms of both travel time
and delays, however, air service is more time consuming
and of lesser overall quality. Due to the airlines' move to-
ward increased hub-and-spoke networks, service has been
concentrated on those large airports selected as "hubs"
by individual airlines. These hub airports and the cities
they serve have benefitted from increased frequencies,
but have suffered from increased fares, congestion and
delays, and may encounter poor quality service in the fu-
ture from airlines which have monopoly control over
them.
Smaller communities have had the worst of all worlds
since the beginning of airline deregulation.8 0 Flight de-
partures, seating capacities, type and quality of service
have all declined, while fares have increased substan-
7, Happiness Is a Cheap Seat, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 1989, at 68, 71. "Between 1985
and 1987 [twenty] American airlines merged. None of these mergers was chal-
lenged by the Department of Transportation even though some of them create
near monopolies at certain hubs." Id. at 71.
Id. at 68.
" J. MOLLOYJR., THE U.S. COMMUTER AIRLINE INDUSTRY 62 (1985).
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tially.8 ' The majority of small communities have suffered
service reductions, and 28% have lost all their service.
Public concern over air safety and delays reached un-
precedented levels in recent years. Due to increased traf-
fic volume and no expansion or enhancement of the air
system infrastructure (including airports, runways, and
the air traffic control system), reports of near midair colli-
sions, air traffic control errors, and inordinately long de-
lays all have substantially increased in recent years.
Despite the perception that the margin of air safety has
narrowed, the number of fatal air accidents has actually
fallen during deregulation. Still, many observers warn
that greater attention must be paid to improving airway
and airport capacity and safety conditions to avoid the po-
tential ramifications of further deterioration.
In light of FAA forecasts of continuing increases in air
traffic, more activity has recently begun in new airport
construction and expansion. Since the completion of Dal-
las-Fort Worth International Airport in 1974, no new ma-
jor airports have been built or planned in the United
States, despite the fact that national passenger demand
has doubled. With the realization that the nation's airport
capacity needs to be enlarged, plans are underway for air-
port expansion and enhancement in seven U.S. cities.8 2
The largest and most ambitious of these is the proposed
$3 billion new international airport in Denver, a project
which has just recently been approved by local voters.
The proposed Denver International Airport, to be op-
erating by 1993, will become, according to the current de-
sign, the largest airport in the country. It will encompass
"' Id. at 59-62. Since smaller communities have not been able to attract dis-
count fares, they have had to recover their costs from the individual markets caus-
ing a marked increase in their rates. The increased rates have in turn encouraged
passengers to commute to large hub airports. Id. at 62.
- Frerkling, Denver Wi'arned: Others Need Airport Funds, Too, Denver Post, July 3,
1988, § A, at 1, col. 3. These projects include new airports in Denver, Colorado
and Austin, Texas; new terminals in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Orlando, Flor-
ida; and new runways in Nashville, Tennessee, Indianapolis, Indiana and Dallas-
Fort Worth, Texas. Id. at 15A, col. 1. The latest of these projects is set for com-
pletion in the mid 1990s. Id.
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44.5 square miles, and eventually have eleven runways
with a capacity of 1,230,000 flight operations per year by
2020. The FAA predicts that the new airport will be the
second busiest in the nation behind Chicago's O'Hare by
the year 2000. The FAA readily recognizes the need for a
new superhub somewhere in the western United States.
Currently, Denver's Stapleton International Airport ex-
periences severe capacity constraints, congestion, and de-
lays which ripple through the entire national air system.
The new Denver airport is an important step in the direc-
tion of easing future nationwide air traffic flow, but it
alone will not solve the pressing national need for new
capacity.
The airline deregulation movement, and indeed the no-
tion of deregulation itself, remains a very controversial
matter. Evidence exists both in favor of and in opposition
to what has transpired in the airline industry over the last
decade.8" In recent years, however, there seems to be a
growing disenchantment with deregulation, as many
problems have become manifest. Even Alfred Kahn, one
of the chief proponents of deregulation, admits that the
last ten years have been no walk among the roses.84
At least, for now, it appears unlikely that any sort of ma-
jor re-regulation is on the horizon. The full-scale deregu-
lation of the airline industry has been indelibly etched
upon the country's economic landscape. Up to now,
changes to the laissez-faire approach have been very fo-
cused and relatively small in scale, such as the recent re-
quirement that airlines publish on-time performance
records. Now that we have experienced ten years of air-
- The opposing views expressed by Brenner and Kahn reflect the ongoing de-
bate. See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 20, at 226 ("One thing can be said with cer-
tainty: the nature of the deregulated industry is radically different from that
forecast by the deregulators. It is not the market of open, continual free entry by
new entrepreneurs which was predicted."); Kahn, supra note 23, at 251 ("Deregu-
lation and the competition it unleashed, however messy and imperfect, have
brought the traveling public benefits worth billions of dollars a year, curbed and
reversed the wage/price spiral, broken up institutional rigidities, and swept away
legal and psychological barriers to productivity and innovation.").
11 Kahn supra note 23.
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line deregulation, however, momentum seems to be
building in the direction of some modest regulatory re-
form, specifically in the areas of ensuring sustainable com-
petition, protecting consumers' rights, prohibiting price
discrimination, and enhancing service to small communi-
ties. Of course, if the industry continues to exercise addi-
tional monopoly or oligopoly characteristics, there may
ultimately be no choice but to re-regulate on a large scale.
More likely, though, is a flexible regulatory arrangement,
whereby individual airlines will still have considerable
freedom to choose how most efficiently to run their busi-
nesses, but will be subject to some regulatory authority
when societal equity is compromised.

